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[So F. No. 19580. In Bank. Jan. 17, 1958.] 
Guardianship of the Persons and Estates of DONALD 
BRUCE HENWOOD et a!., Minors. MARY G. ALEX-
ANDER, Appellant, V. GEORGE DONALD HENWOOD 
et a!., Respondents. 
[1] Guardian and Ward-Custod1: Adoption-Relinquishment to 
Adoption Agenc1-Custod1.-Prob. Code, §§ 1400,1405, 1406, 
1440, 1500, 1512 (relating to guardians, their appointment, 
powers and duties), and Civ. Code, § 224n (relating to duties 
and rights of adoption agencies), cannot operate to control 
the custody of the same child at the same time; a child can-
Dot be in the custody of a guardian subject to court control 
and at the same time be in the custody and control of an adop-
tion agency; the right to custody must rest with one custodian 
or the other since no machinery is provided whereby it ma1 
be divided between them. 
[2] Id.-Oustod1: Adoption-lLe1inquishment to Adoption Agency 
-Custod1.-In the absence of an express provision depriving 
the court of power to appoint a guardian of a child that has 
been validly relinquished for adoption, the adoption statutes 
may not reasonably be interpreted as depriving such child of 
the protection afforded by guardianship proceedings in a 
proper ease. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Adoption of Children, § 12; Guardian and 
Ward, §§ 61,72. 
!rIcK. Dig. References: [1-4] Guardian and Ward, § 54; Adop-
tion, § 21; 15, 8, 9] Guardian lind Ward, § 9; Adoption, § 21; [6] 
Adoption, § 1; [7] Adoption, § 5; [10] Guardian and Ward, § 9. 
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[8] lcl.--Oustody: Adoption-Relinquishment to Adoption Alency. 
-Ouatody.-It cannot be assumed that adoption agencies will 
necessarily in all cases have such wisdom and competence that 
they may be set apart ·from other custodians and given ca,'e 
blanche in their control of relinquished children until a peti-
tion for adoption is before the court j the Legislature would 
not leave such curtailment of the court's power to be drawn 
by inference alone from adoption provisions that contain no 
reference to guardianship proceedings. 
[4] ld.-Cuatody: Adoption-Relinquishment to Adoption Alency 
-Oustody.-A child is not a party to an agreement for his re-
linquishment to an adoption agency, but it is his interest that 
the court must protect in passing on a petition for adoption 
or for appointment of a guardian. 
[6] ld.-Appointment of Guardian: Adoption-Relinquishment to 
Adoption Agency.-The court may not ignore the adoption 
procedures and supersede them by appointment of a guardian 
on a ground that, absent relinquishment to a licensed agency, 
might support the conclusion that the appointment of a guard- . 
ian was necessary or convenient; the statutory provisions can 
be reconciled and eBect given to both statutory schemes for 
protecting the welfare of the child only if the requirement 
of necessity or convenience for the appointment of a guardian 
is interpreted in the light of the agency adoption provisions 
in the case of relinquished children. 
[6) Adoption-Judicial Attitude.-Adoption of children is ordi-
narily preferred to guardianship. 
[7] 1d.-OoDStruction of 8tatutes.-Whenever possible, such • 
construction should be given adoption laws as will sustain, 
rather than defeat, the object they have in new. 
[8] Guardian and Ward-Appointment of Guardian: Adoption-
Belinquishment to Adoption Agency.-The statutes governing 
the adoption of relinquished children express by clear implica-
tion a legislative determination that the appointment of a 
guardian is not necessary or convenient while the adoption pro-
cedure is running its proper course; in the absence of a show-
ing that the adoption agency is unfit to have temporary custody 
of the child or that it is improbable that the child will be 
adopted, the appointment of a guardian is neither necessary 
Dor convenient, but if the agency is shown to be unfit, the 
child's immediate welfare demands intervention, and if it is 
shown that adoption is improbable, continued waiting-room· 
custody by the agency can DO longer be justified as promotive 
of adoption, and the guardianship of a willing relative may 
better serve the best interests of the child. 
[7] See Cal . .Tur.2d, Adoption of Children, § 4; Am...Tur •• Adoption 
of Children, 15 et seq. 
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[9] Id.-Appolntment of Guardian: Adoption-Belinlluisbment to 
Adoption Ageney.-Ordinarily, it may be assumed that the 
natural parents and an a30ption agency have the oompetence 
to decide that adoption is preferable to guardianship, but 
sucb decision must be approved by the court before adoption 
can take place and may be challenged in guardianship pro-
ceedings if it appears that it is improbable that adoption will 
occur. 
[10] Id.-Appolntment of Guardian.-Where the trial court'. rul-
ing dismissing a maternal grandmother's petition for guardian-
ship of two minor children was based on the erroneous view 
that it had no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian after a valid 
relinquishment to an adoption agency had been made, the 
grandmother should be afforded opportunity to make a showing 
of necessity or convenience. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County dismissing a petition for the appointment of a 
guardian of the persons of two minor children. Marvin Sher-
win, JUdge. Reversed. 
Fred B. Mellmann and Russell P. Studebaker for Ap-
pellant. 
J. F. Coakley, District Attorney (Alameda), R. Robert 
Hunter, Chief Assistant District Attorney, Richard J. Moore, 
Deputy District Attorney, and Raymond N. Baker, for Re-
spondents. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Richard L. 
Mayers, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Curiae, on behalf 
of Respondents. 
TRA YNOR, J .-In June, 1955, the mother of Donald Bruce 
Henwood and Joel Arthur Henwood died. In July, 1955, 
their father relinquished them for adoption to the Alameda 
County Welfare Commission, a '"licensed adoption agency. 
In October, 1955, their maternal grandmother, Mary G. 
Alexander, petitioned to be appointed their guardian. At 
that time the children were 8 and 5 years of age. The trial 
court found that Mrs. Alexander, aged 63, was a fit person 
to have the custody of the children and that their father had 
placed them for adoption believing that "it would be in the 
best interests of sai'd minors that they be adopted by parents 
selected by the Commission, in order that they might have 
tI C.Id-ll 
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the benetit of a normal parental relationship." It con- ,' .. 
eluded that "by reason of the relinquishment of said minors 
and the fact that they are in the care, custody and control 
of a licensed County adoption agency, as a matter of law, this 
court is precluded from determining that it is either necessary 
or convenient that a guardian be appointed for either of said 
minors under the provisions of Sections 1405 and 1440 of the 
Probate Code." Mrs. Alexander appeals. 
She contends that the provisions of the Civil Code with 
respect to adoptions do not affect the court's jurisdiction to 
appoint a guardian and that therefore the court erred in 
refusing to determine whether the best interests of the chil-
dren established the necessity or convenience of her appoint-
ment and in dismissing her petition. Respondents contend, 
on the other hand, that by establishing a comprehensive scheme 
for the placement of children for adoption through licensed 
adoption agencies, the Legislature has necessarily precluded 
the appointment of a guardian once a child has been validly 
relinquished to an adoption agency. 
Sections 1405 and 1440 of the Probate Code provide for 
the appointment of a guardian when necessary or convenient. 
The court is to be guided by "what appears to be for the best 
interest of the child in respect to its temporal and mental and 
moral welfare" (Prob. Code, § 1406), and the guardian has 
the care and custody of the ward (Prob. Code, § 1500) subject 
to the regulation and control of the court. (Prob. Code, 
§§ 1400,1512). 
Section 224n of the Civil Code provides: "The agency 
to which a child has been relinquished for adoption shall be 
responsible for the care of the child, and shall be entitled 
to the custody and control of the child at all times until a 
petition for adoption has been granted. Any placement for 
temporary care, or for adoption made by the agency, may be 
terminated at the discretion of the agency at any time prior 
to the granting of a petition for adoption. In the event of 
termination of any placement for temporary care or for 
adoption, the child shall be returned promptly to the physical 
custody of the agency. 
"No petition may be tiled to adopt a child relinquished 
to a licensed adoption agency except by the prospective 
adoptive parents with whom the child has been placed for 
adoption by the adoption agency. After the petition for 
adoption has been tiled, the agency may remove the child from 
the prospective adoptive parents only with the approval of 
) 
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the court, upon motion by the agency after notice to the 
prospective adoptive parents, supported by an affidavit or 
affidavits stating the grouD(\s on which removal is sought.· 
If an agency refuses to consent to the adoption of a child 
by the person or persons with whom the agency placed the 
child for adoption, the superior court may nevertheless decree 
the adoption if it finds that the refusal to consent is not in 
the best interest of the child." 
[1] It is apparent from the foregoing statutes that the 
adoption provisions and the guardianship provisions cannot 
operate to control the custody of the same child at the same 
time. A child cannot be in the custody of a guardian subject 
to the control of the court and at the same time be in the 
custody and control of the agency. In any given case the 
right to custody must rest with one custodian or the other 
for no machinery is provided whereby it may be divided be-
tween them. Neither in the statutes with respect to guardian-
ship nor in those with respect to adoption, however, has the 
Legislature expressly provided which should prevail. 
Mrs. Alexander contends that the guardianship provisions 
must necessarily be considered paramount, for otherwise no 
court would be available to the child to protect its interests 
during the period between relinquishment and the filing of a 
petition for adoption. She points out that even natural 
parents are not given such immunity from judicial control 
and contends that adoption agencies should likewise be sub-
ject to judicial supervision at all times. Moreover, she con-
tends that the crucial decision to relinquish the child for 
adoption should be subject to review to determine whether 
in a given case guardianship rather than adoption will serve 
the best interests of the child. If review of this determination 
must be postponed until the court is called upon to approve 
or disapprove a petition for adoption, an event that may 
never occur, the child may be permanently deprived of the 
. benefits of the care and custody of a guardian that its welfare 
demands. . 
R.espondents contend, however, that adoption is preferred 
to guardianship (see 111 re Santos, 185 Cal. 127, 130 [195 P. 
1055]), that the legislative scheme is designed to secure to 
children the benefits of adoption, that to permit the court 
to interfere with that scheme by appointing a guardian would 
subvert its purpos,e, and that the child's interest is adequately 
-ThiB lentenlle was added in 1957. 
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protected by the exercise of the parent's and agency's judg. 
ment that adoption is desirable and by the court review 
provided before adoption can b.ke place. 
[2] In the absence of an express provision d.epriving the 
court of power to appoint a guardian of a child that has 
been validly relinquished for adoption, we do not believe 
that the adoption statutes may reasonably be interpreted as 
depriving such a child of the protection afforded by guardian· 
ship proceedings in a proper case. "Throughout custody 
law runs the thread of the interest of the state in the welfare 
of its children. It is this sovereign interest that functions 
like a protective arm to keep open the doors of the court to 
preserve, to control, and to modify the child's status in 
relation to its elders." (Lennard, Enforcement and Modifica· 
tum of Child Custody Awards, Family Law for California 
LawYers 759.) [3] We cannot assume that adoption agencies 
will necessarily in all cases have such wisdom and competence 
that they may be set apart from other custodians and given 
carte blanche in their control of relinquished children until 
a petition for adoption is before the court. Certainly, the 
Legislature would not leave such a curtailment of the court's 
power to be drawn by inference alone from adoption pro· 
visions that contain no reference to guardianship proceedings. 
Moreover, in this respect, the provisions of Civil Code, section 
224m, making the relinquishment binding on the parents and 
the agency add nothing to those of section 224n giving the 
agency responsibility for the care, custody and control of 
the child. [4] The child is not a party to the relinquishment 
agreement, but it is his interest that the court must protect 
in passing on a petition for adoption or for the appointment 
of a guardian. (See Adoption of McDonald, 43 Ca1.2d 447, 
461 [274 P.2d 860].) 
[6] Our conclusion that the adoption statutes do not 
preclude the appointment of a guardian for a validly reo 
linquished child does not mean that the court may ignore 
the adoption procedures and supersede them by the appoint. 
ment of a guardian on grounds that, absent relinquishment 
to a licensed agency, might support the conclusion that the 
appointment of a guardian was necessary or convenient. 
(Cf. Guardianship of Minviear, 141 Ca1.App.2d 703. 707 
[297 P.2d 105].) The statutory provisions can be reconciled 
and eif('ct given to both statutory schcmes for protecting 
the welfare of the child only if the requirement of neces· 
sity or convenience for the appointment of a guardian is 
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interpreted in the light of the agency adoption provisions in 
the case of relinquished children. Only in this way is it pos-
sible not only to prevent abuses of the adoption procedure 
but also to protect that proce<\ure from interference when it 
is functioning properly. [6] As stated above, adoption is 
ordinarily to be preferred to guardianship. [7] "Whenever 
possible, such a construction should be given adoption laws as 
will sustain, rather than defeat, the object they have in view. 
[Citation.] The main purpose of adoption statutes is the 
promotion of the welfare of children, bereft of the benefits of 
the home and care of their real parents, by the legal recog-
nition and regulation of the consummation of the closest con-
ceivable counterpart of the relationship of parent and child. 
While a guardian of the person of a minor is charged with a 
high duty and serious responsibility in the care of his ward, 
nevertheless the status of guardian and ward falls short of 
the close approximation to the relationship of parent and 
child which is attainable through actual adoption culminating, 
as it does, in the child becoming a member, to all intents and 
purposes, of the family of the foster parents." (In re Santos, 
supra, 185 Cal. 127, 130.) [8] The Legislature has adopted 
a comprehensive plan for the adoption of relinquisbed children 
and has provided that a valid relinquishment is binding on 
the natural parent or parent.s and that no person other than 
prospective adoptive parents selected by the agency may 
petition for adoption. This procedure would obviously be 
frlMtrated, if at any time the court could determine in the 
exercise of its independent judgment and discretion that 8 
guardian should be appointed and custody removed from the 
agency or prospective adoptive parents selected by it. The 
prohibition against the filing of a petition for adoption by a 
stranger could in effect be circumvented and the agency's 
primary responsibility to select a custodian and prospective 
adoptive parents nullified. In the light of these considerations, 
we conclude that the statutes· governing the adoption of relin-
quished children express by clear implication a legislative 
determination that the appointment of a guardian is not 
necessary or convenient while the adoption procedure is run-
ning its proper course. Accordingly, in the absence of a 
showing that the agency is unfit to have the temporary custody 
of the child or that it is improbable that the child will be 
adopted, the appointment of a guardian is neither necessary 
nor convenient .. On the other hand, if the agency is shown 
to be unfit, the child's immediate welfare demands interven-
) 
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tion, and if it is shown that adoption is improbable, continued 
waiting-room custody by the agency can no longer be justified 
as promotive of adoption, and the guardianship of a willing 
relative may well better serve the best interests of the child. 
[9] Ordinarily, it may be assumed that the natural parents 
and the agency have the competence to decide that adoption 
is preferable to guardianship. This decision, however, must 
be approved by the court before adoption can take place and 
may be challenged in guardianship proceedings if it appears 
that it is improbable that adoption will occur. It is true that 
in the interim changes affecting the child may take place, but 
the risk of harm therefrom is materially less than the risk 
of harm that would flow from permitting every adoption 
proceeding to be halted midstream for a judicial determination 
of whether guardianship might be preferable. The legislative 
choice between these risks is both apparent and reasonable. 
[10] Although no showing was made in the present case 
that the agency was unfit to have temporary custody of the 
children or that adoption was improbable, the trial court's 
ruling was based on the erroneous view that it had no juris-
diction in any case to appoint a guardian after a valid relin-
quishment had been made. Under these circumstances Mrs. 
Alexander should be afforded the opportunity to make a 
showing of necessity or convenience as herein defined. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Spence, J., and McComb, 
J., concurred. 
Schauer, J., eoncurred in the judgment. 
I 
